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Executive summary 
• The National Commission of Audit appointed by the Abbott Government is a continuation of a long line of 
budget reviews undertaken by Commonwealth and state and territory governments in Australia. 
• Most previous budget reviews have been conducted by persons with some familiarity of, but outside, the 
bureaucracy, such as senior businesspersons. This appears to reflect a view of governments that the existing 
bureaucracy is ill-suited to advise on substantial budgetary reform, and that independent reviewers will 
provide objective or credible analysis. However, the use of outsiders has also typically raised public 
suspicions about a government’s true motives or agenda. 
• Previous budget reviews and Commissions of Audit have all tended to make similar findings and 
recommendations. Some areas of proposed economic reform have been substantially addressed. However, 
other areas of possible reform—despite having been repeatedly proposed by reviewers—have not been 
adopted by governments.  
• While budget reviews can be highly effective at shaping and focusing the agenda of newly-elected 
governments, they also pose risks for the governments that appoint them. This is particularly the case when 
they deliver recommendations that are controversial or too politically unpalatable to be implemented.  
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Introduction 
On 22 October 2013 the Abbott Government announced the appointment of a National Commission of Audit.1 
In announcing the review, Treasurer Joe Hockey and Finance Minister Cormann said ‘[i]t is …essential that the 
Commonwealth government live within its means and begin to pay down debt’.2  
The review, headed by the president of the Business Council of Australia, Tony Shepherd AO, has broad terms of 
reference that are intended to allow it to ‘assess the role and scope of Government, as well as ensuring 
taxpayers’ money is spent wisely and in an efficient manner’.3 The other members of the Commission are the 
current head of the New South Wales Independent Regulatory and Pricing Tribunal, Dr Peter Boxall AO, former 
public servants Tony Cole AO and Robert Fisher AM, and former politician Amanda Vanstone.  
The appointment of the current Commission of Audit has not passed without criticism. For example, the Shadow 
Finance Minister, Tony Burke has described the review as a ‘Commission of Cuts,’ and declared that it was ‘an 
extraordinary outsourcing of the responsibilities of Government across to big business’. 4  
The current National Commission of Audit is but one in a long series of budget reviews that have been 
conducted by Commonwealth, state and territory governments in Australia. Many previous reviews have largely 
been forgotten by the general public and sometimes even by the governments that have commissioned them. 
Others provided broad recommendations that have assisted in providing coherence and purpose to what have 
usually been new administrations.  
Examining the origins, conduct and conclusions of, and reactions to previous reviews provides some indications 
about how the current National Commission of Audit might unfold. While every review is inevitably a product of 
its time and the political and economic circumstances in which it was commissioned, there are recurring themes 
that emerge from many of these exercises. Arguably, the general nature of the findings and recommendations of 
budget reviews can be broadly predicted, but how—and even if—governments respond to them cannot.   
Examining past reviews may also show whether the current review has provided genuinely new approaches to 
managing and prioritising Commonwealth expenditure and service delivery, or has rehashed well-worn policy 
prescriptions posed repeatedly by prior reviews.  
Chronology of budget reviews 
The earliest attempt at a systematic review of the finances of a jurisdiction in Australia was the Western 
Australian Legislative Council’s 1873 Report upon Departmental Expenditure. That inquiry was appointed ‘to 
consider and report upon the necessity for reducing government Departmental Expenditure…’5 Since then, at 
least 22 other systematic reviews of expenditure have been undertaken in the states and territories, or by the 
Commonwealth. Table 1 provides a list of previous budget reviews in Australia. 
  
1.  J Hockey (Treasurer) and M Cormann (Minister for Finance), Coalition commences National Commission of Audit, media release, 22 October 
2013, accessed 4 April 2014. 
2. Ibid. 
3.  Ibid. 
4.  T Burke, ‘Transcript of press conference’, 23 October 2013, accessed 4 April 2014. 
5.  Select Committee, Departmental expenditure, Legislative Council of WA, 1873, accessed 4 April 2014.  
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Table 1: Chronology of budget reviews in Australia 
Years Jurisdiction Political affiliation Title 
1873 Western Australia Not applicable Select Committee of the Legislative Council to 
Consider and Report Upon Departmental 
Expenditure 
1918–21 Commonwealth Nationalist Royal Commission ... upon the public expenditure 
of the Commonwealth of Australia with a view to 
effecting economies (Federal Economies 
Commission) 
1927 South Australia Liberal Federation Special Committee on State Finances 
1973 Commonwealth Labor Review of the Continuing Expenditure Policies of 
the Previous Government 
1980–81 Commonwealth Liberal/Country 
Party coalition 
Review of Commonwealth Functions 
1988 New South Wales Liberal Focus on Reform: Report on The State’s Finances 
(NSW Commission of Audit) 
1992 Tasmania Liberal Tasmania in the Nineties 
1992 Victoria Labor State Finance Victoria: Independent Review of 
Victoria’s Public Sector Finances 
1992–93 Victoria Liberal/National coalition Victorian Commission of Audit 
1993 Western Australia Liberal Report of the Independent Commission to Review 
Public Sector Finances 
1993-94 South Australia Liberal Charting the way forward: improving public sector 
performance 
1996 Queensland National Queensland Commission of Audit 
1996 Commonwealth Liberal/National coalition National Commission of Audit 
2001–02 Australian Capital 
Territory 
Labor Report on the State of the Territory’s Finances 
2001–02 Western Australia Labor Review of the Effective Delivery of Government 
Priorities 
2005–06 Australian Capital 
Territory 
Labor Strategic and Functional Review 
2008–09 Western Australia Liberal/National coalition Economic Audit Committee 
2009–10 South Australia Labor Sustainable Budget Commission 
2011–12 Victoria Liberal/National coalition Independent Review of State Finances 
2011–12 New South Wales Liberal/National coalition NSW Commission of Audit 
2012–13 Northern Territory Country Liberal Party Renewal Management Board 
2012–13 Queensland Liberal National Party Queensland Commission of Audit 
2013–14 Commonwealth Liberal/National coalition National Commission of Audit 
Further information on the various reviews is at Appendix A. 
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An examination of previous budget reviews in Australia shows that they have typically: 
• been conducted by independent panels, or ‘outsiders’ 
• been ad hoc bodies possessing no formal or coercive powers 
• systematically examined all aspects of a government’s finances 
• been tasked with making recommendations directly to the executive government, and through it to the 
general public upon the public release by the executive of the panels’ reports. 
Several budget reviews have deviated from this model somewhat. For example, the 1980–81 Commonwealth 
Review of Commonwealth Functions was conducted by a sole insider, a serving Cabinet minister, and never 
released publicly. The 1919–21 Federal Economies Commission was established under the Royal Commissions 
Act 1902 and would have possessed all the coercive powers available to a Royal Commission.   
Reviews into other areas of public administration, such as the 1976 Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration (Coombs Review), have looked at related issues and made comparable (or complementary) 
recommendations in many areas. However, as they did not have as their primary focus the respective 
government’s budgetary position, they have not been characterised as budget reviews for the purposes of this 
paper.6 
The commission of audit nomenclature was first adopted by the 1988 NSW report, Focus on Reform: Report on 
the State’s Finances.7 That review was conducted by three businesspeople who were collectively referred to as 
the ‘NSW Commission of Audit’. This terminology is somewhat unhelpful as such reviews are generally not 
‘audits’ within the meaning of Australian Auditing Standards, they have been increasingly referred to as such.  
Genesis and timing of budget reviews 
As shown in table 1, budget reviews have increasingly been used by conservative governments. Indeed, 
excluding the Australian Capital Territory, the last incoming conservative government—either at the 
Commonwealth or state and territory level—not to conduct such a review upon entering into office was the 
Tasmanian Government of Robin Gray, elected in 1982. Most systemic reviews of governments’ fiscal positions 
have occurred upon a change in government, or early in the term of an incoming government, and have often 
been presented as a response to a perceived budgetary crisis inherited from the former administration.  
Whatever their stated justification, budget reviews early in the term of incoming governments appear to also 
have other objectives, such as overcoming institutional resistance to changes within the bureaucracy, helping 
build community consensus for proposed reforms and ensuring that gains begin to accrue from any political or 
economic pain within the electoral cycle.8 
Labor governments have also utilised budget reviews, however, they appear more likely after several years in 
office, and have been less inclined to release reports and recommendations publicly. The Gallop Labor 
Government in Western Australia and the Stanhope Labor Government in the Australian Capital Territory both 
conducted reviews known as ‘functional reviews’, which were really budget reviews under another name. 
Neither review was released publicly, but both made a range of recommendations regarding expenditure which 
were later adopted by the respective Governments. 
Fiscal consolidation has not been the sole consideration. For example, the Whitlam Labor Government in 
commissioning the 1973 review, appeared more concerned with finding the ‘fiscal space’ for that Government’s 
intended programs rather than dealing with a perceived fiscal or economic crisis inherited from the former 
government. Reflective of this, Prime Minister Whitlam cited a decision of Cabinet ‘to apply close scrutiny to 
continuing policies of the Previous Government so that room may be found for your own higher priority 
programs’ when appointing the reviewers.9 The 1919–21 Federal Economies Commission was seemingly 
appointed because the Government had been impressed by more limited royal commissions into the defence 
forces and public service conducted immediately prior. The Leader newspaper in Melbourne noted that the 
6. Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration, Report, Commonwealth of Australia, 1976. 
7.  For brevity, this paper refers to relevant reviews and inquiries generally as ‘reviews’.  Specific reviews and inquiries are referred to by their 
name, or year and jurisdiction which conducted them, depending on the context. 
8.  C Walsh, ‘Creating a competitive culture in the public service: the role of audits and other reviews’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 
54(3) Sept. 1995, p. 326. 
9.  Review of the Continuing Expenditure Policies of the Previous Government, Report, Commonwealth of Australia, June 1973, p. v. 
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Federal Economies Commission would also ‘relieve Ministers to a great extent of the responsibility which they 
themselves should shoulder of advising upon curtailment of expenditure…’10  
Membership 
The majority of the membership of reviews has been dominated by businesspeople; often with a single serving 
or former public servant. While many businesspersons with seemingly relevant expertise in accounting or 
finance have been appointed, many have had high-level but general business expertise. It appears that the 
overall desire of governments is to engender some perceived business acumen, rather than import specific 
accountancy or economic skills. Where such skills have been required, they have often been provided by 
secretariats comprised of serving public servants.  
Another reason for the appointment of such ‘outsiders’ may be a desire within the respective governments for 
quick changes to both budgetary and administrative processes that are perceived as unable to be delivered in 
time, or at all, by the bureaucracy itself. Academic Cliff Walsh has suggested that: 
…people knowledgeable about, but at arms length from, the public sector culture would be less likely to be seen as 
captives of the pre-existing culture, more likely to mark out the sharp changes in practices necessary to enable 
public sector policy-makers and managers rapidly obtain sustained improvements in public sector performance. 11  
Outsiders may have also been preferred because they are perceived to have no direct ‘interest’ or ‘stake’ in the 
outcomes, and have no perceived loyalties within the bureaucracy in question.  
Serving public servants have typically been expected to disavow any responsibilities that might have attached to 
their public employment when participating in reviews. For example, the 1973 Commonwealth Review of 
Continuing Expenditure was comprised entirely of public servants and political advisors. Prime Minister Whitlam, 
in appointing the review, however, directed that ‘these officers serve in their personal as distinct from 
departmental or other capacities’. 12  
Having public servants review their counterparts appears to have created animosity between reviewers and the 
bureaucracy. On the 1919–21 Federal Economies Commission, for example, the chief accountant at the 
Postmaster-General’s Department, Gilbert Haldane, served alongside two businesspeople, Sir Robert Gibson and 
Geo Turton. In their final report, Gibson and Turton touched upon the animosity caused by Haldane’s 
participation, when they commented: 
…the indulgence of personal invective in regard to the member of the Public Service appointed on this Commission 
is such that cannot be fairly passed over by those members of the Commission outside the service. 
We desire to place on record our entire disagreement with the personal attacks upon Mr. Haldane… 13 
Academics have featured less prominently than public servants, but representatives from other interest groups 
such as the not-for-profit sector or trade unions have largely been absent from reviews.  
Several people have conducted multiple reviews. Don Nicholls AM, who was Deputy Secretary in the New South 
Wales Treasury, has been involved in four reviews. He served on the 1988 New South Wales Commission of 
Audit and the 1992 Tasmanian and 1993–94 South Australian reviews in the capacity as an executive member, 
and was the ‘independent reviewer’ for the 1992 Victorian review. Businessman Charles Curran was appointed 
to the 1988 NSW and 1992 Tasmanian reviews and Robert Officer was appointed to both the 1992 Victorian and 
1996 National Commissions of Audit. Former secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
Peter Shergold, was appointed to the 2008–09 Western Australian review and the former secretary of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Michael Costello, was appointed to both the 2001–02 Western 
Australian review and the 2005–06 Australian Capital Territory review. 
Two former politicians have been appointed to budget reviews; the former Commonwealth Treasurer, Peter 
Costello, chairing the 2012–13 Queensland review and former Howard Government Minister,  Amanda Vanstone 
having been appointed to the 2013–14 National Commission of Audit. The increasing appointment of clearly 
10.  ‘Commonwealth expenditure: board of inquiry,’ Leader, 16 November 1918, p. 26, accessed 4 April 2014. 
11.  C Walsh, op. cit., p. 325 
12.  Review of the Continuing Expenditure Policies of the Previous Government, Report, op. cit., p. v, emphasis in original. 
13.  Royal Commission …upon the public expenditure of Australia, Final Report, 1921, p. 36, accessed 4 April 2014. 
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politically aligned persons, such as former politicians, may begin to dilute the sense that budget reviews provide 
a truly independent or objective assessment of a jurisdiction’s fiscal and economic position. 
Frameworks and approaches 
While all reviews have focused upon the fiscal position of the various jurisdictions, several have sought to 
articulate a broader conceptual framework for guiding their inquiries and recommendations. Generally, these 
have been free-market or ‘New Right’ approaches, which tended to promote a more limited scope for 
governmental intervention within the economy and society, and support for more market-based modes of 
service delivery. Such thinking became increasing prevalent as the structural difficulties within the Australian 
economy became more pronounced during the 1970s. In examining the recent history of New Right thinking in 
Australia, political scientists Emy and Hughes observe: 
…[New Right thinkers] wished to return to the classical liberal ideal whereby governments (i) confined themselves 
to providing only those services which individuals could not easily provide for themselves; and (ii) were responsible 
for maintaining a secure framework of general, non-discriminatory laws within which private individuals could 
conduct their own business, or pursue their own values. 14 
Generally the approaches adopted by the various reviews have reflected these principles. For example, the 1988 
New South Wales Commission of Audit and 1996 National Commission of Audit both sought to clarify what was, 
in their view, the appropriate scope for governmental activity in the economy and society. The New South Wales 
reviewers framed their thinking around the following questions: 
• why should the expenditure be undertaken at all? What would result if the program/activity was abolished? 
• what special features of the program/activity mean that the goods cannot be provided more efficiently and cost effectively 
by the private sector? 
• why should Parliament, Ministers and senior public service executives be devoting scarce time to the mechanics of 
producing these goods? 15 
In the 1996 National Commission of Audit, the reviewers adopted a similar decision matrix: 
• first, decide whether or not government involvement is warranted 
• second, in areas where government involvement is considered appropriate, ensure program objectives are clear and 
effectively pursued 
• third, ensure resources are applied efficiently (that is, at minimal cost). 16 
These approaches would tend to support the devolution or cessation of government activities in particular areas, 
lower taxation burdens, and a greater role for the private sector and individuals.  
Other reviews have appeared to come to conclusions consistent with these free market ideas, but in a more 
haphazard manner. For example, the 1927 South Australian Supplemental Report, written by the two external 
reviewers, provided in just two pages a succinct articulation of what they considered to be the key economic 
challenges facing not just South Australia, but Australia generally. A primary concern was a perceived lack of 
fiscal restraint arising from ‘the influence of politics’ upon expenditure decisions and the variability of 
government revenue receipts which was partly due to the cyclical nature of the resources sector. It warned that 
‘[a] serious diminution in the production of metals has occurred in recent years’ and that the industry shows 
signs of disappearing’.17 The reviewers suggested Australia: 
[as] a country with a large external debt …must conform to the fact that she must pay interest on her debts abroad 
and must at all hazards [see] that those industries which are relied upon to meet external obligations are not 
prejudiced. 18  
14.  H Emy and O Hughes, Australian politics, realities in conflict, second edn, MacMillan, Melbourne, 1991, p. 195. 
15.  New South Wales Commission of Audit, Focus on reform, NSW Government, 1988, p. 77. 
16.  National Commission of Audit, Report to the Commonwealth Government, Australian Government Publishing Service (AGPS), Canberra, June 
1996. 
17.  South Australia, Parliament, Special Committee on State Finance: Supplemental report, Parl Paper 76a, Adelaide, 1927, p. 4, accessed 4 April 
2014. 
18.  Ibid., p. 3. 
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They noted the link between industry protection—in the form of tariffs—and wage arbitration, and observed 
that ‘an increasing number of people are thinking that the policy is bad for Australia as a whole’.19 It was not 
until the 1970s and 1980s, however, that any significant changes to these two mutually dependent limbs of 
Australian economic policy were introduced; tariff reductions and labour market reforms.20 On what would now 
be called deregulation, the two external reviewers asserted: 
A feeling has grown up since the war that disabilities can be cured by Acts of Parliament and that beneficent 
Governments can appoint boards to meet every trouble. 21 
Other reviews have been a lot less ambitious. The 1992 Victorian review, established late in the term of the 
Kirner Labor Government was somewhat limited, with the reviewer noting that the terms of reference did not 
‘extend to devising packages aimed at improving the workings of the Victorian economy,’ and ‘do not require 
the preparation of a plan or strategy to achieve particular budget outcomes’.22 The 1992–93 Victorian review 
undertaken by the incoming Kennett Liberal Government, however, acknowledged that earlier review as the 
starting point for its work, which meant that it could be ‘much more concerned with longer-term and strategic 
considerations’. 23 
Findings, themes and recommendations 
Budget reviews are all creatures of their own time and circumstance. Despite this, it is striking how many issues 
have recurred irrespective of the context of the review or the political persuasion of the commissioning 
government. Many areas of proposed reform, however, have now been comprehensively addressed, but other 
areas for reform remain largely untouched. 
‘Living beyond our means’ 
Most budget reviews have discovered dire fiscal circumstances, and sought to caution both governments and 
the general public of the consequences of not taking remedial action. For example, in 1927 a South Australian 
review warned:  
If a man lives beyond his income, everyone knows that a day of reckoning has to be faced. Similarly with a 
Government, there is a time when an overspending policy has to stop, and the sooner the public realises this the 
better. 24 
Similarly, the 1988 New South Wales Commission of Audit introduced its Report by declaring in uppercase that: 
NEW SOUTH WALES HAS BEEN LIVING BEYOND ITS MEANS. 25 
Again in 2006, the Australian Capital Territory Chief Minister Jon Stanhope advised Canberrans:  
We have been living beyond our means. 26 
And the 2012–13 Queensland review’s Interim Report reprised this conclusion when, after assessing the 
government’s budgetary position, it concluded: 
This shows that the State has been “living beyond its means”. 27 
Irrespective of the truth or otherwise of these statements, the political utility of such drastic declarations of the 
‘true’ or ‘real’ state of a jurisdiction’s finances has long been recognised. For example, of the 1988 New South 
Wales Commission of Audit, Gary Sturgess, who was then one of Premier Greiner’s key advisors, is reported to 
19.  Ibid. 
20.  P Kelly, The end of certainty, second ed, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1994, pp. 4–10. 
21.  South Australian Parliament, Special Committee on State Finance: Supplemental report, op. cit., p. 4. 
22.  Independent Review of Victoria’s Public Sector Finances, State Finance Victoria, September 1992, p. 4 of unpaginated introduction. 
23.  Victorian Commission of Audit, Report, May 1993, vol. 1, p. 3. 
24.  South Australian Parliament, Special Committee on State Finance: Supplemental report, op. cit., 1927, p. 3. 
25.  New South Wales Commission of Audit, Focus on Reform, op. cit., p. v. 
26.  Australian Capital Territory, 2006-07 Budget Paper No. 1: Speech, p. 2. 
27.  Queensland Commission of Audit, Interim report, Queensland Government, June 2012, p. 28. 
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have later observed ‘it was a marking exercise … there was no great feeling that New South Wales’ finances were 
in drastic shape, so why do you need a shakeup?’28 
Unsurprisingly, these drastic conclusions have not always passed without dispute. For example, political 
scientists Costar and Economou argue that the 1992–93 Victorian review misrepresented the financial 
circumstances of Victoria as being beset by relatively high expenditure by the prior government, when the reality 
was—in their opinion—that the prior government had actually been a relatively low taxing, rather than high 
spending, administration. 29  
Too big, too involved 
The overall share of economic activity devoted to governmental functions has been questioned by many 
reviews, leading them to question the various activities governments have undertaken. For example the 1927 
South Australian reviewers, went as far as to declare: 
In no other part of the civilised world do Governments enter into operations, other than governing functions, to the 
same extent as is done in Australia… 30  
They went on to identify the provision of utilities, railways and social services as ‘non-governing functions’ of 
particular concern. That review also sought to connect the idea of smaller government with the (purported) 
Australian characteristic of self-reliance. It asserted:  
The calibre of the people is being undermined, and self-reliance, a great characteristic of the pioneers of Australia, 
appears to be a vanishing asset.  In former days people expected results from effort and effort alone, but now there 
is a growing tendency to accept Government assistance if offered or even look out for such assistance. 31 
In a similar vein, when speaking on the 1980–81 Review of Commonwealth Functions Prime Minister Fraser 
advised that ‘[t]he government had taken the view that we would all be better off in an material as well as in a 
social and political sense by establishing a more limited, and more realistic, role for government’.32 Commercial 
activities, he further explained, were better off performed by the private sector, where they would be subject to 
market discipline and more responsive to the needs of consumers, and that the Commonwealth would withdraw 
‘from functions more appropriately handled by the states or the private sector’.33 
In 1988 the New South Wales Commission of Audit asserted a link between the size and role of government and 
overall economic performance when it said:  
There has been considerable concern in Australia in recent years about the role and size of the public sector in both 
the national and State economies.  This is especially so given the significant growth in the size of Government in our 
economies has coincided with a decline in economic performance.  
At the same time, there has been greater community awareness that Government activities are not always 
effectively managed and in fact may impede efficiency in resource allocation. 34 
That review also recommended ‘a significant downsizing of Government, based upon a review of the services 
and activities in which the Government should be engaged’.35 It asserted that there was no inherent role for 
government in providing goods and services that could be provided by the private sector but recognised a role 
for government with respect to certain market failures.36  
Similarly, the 1992 Tasmanian review concluded that: ‘The Government should reassess its role, focus on core 
activities and withdraw methodically from non-core activities which can be provided by the private sector on 
28.  M Laffin and M Painter eds, Reform and reversal, Macmillian, Melbourne, 1995, p. 9. 
29.  B Costar and N Economou, The Kennett revolution, UNSW Press, Sydney, 1999, p. 139. 
30.  South Australian Parliament, Special Committee on State Finance: Report on the Financial Position of South Australia, Parl Paper 76, Adelaide, 
1927, p. 3. 
31.  South Australian Parliament, Special Committee on State Finance: Supplemental report, Parl Paper 76a, Adelaide, 1927, p. 4. 
32.  M Fraser, ‘Ministerial statement: Review of Commonwealth functions,’ House of Representatives, Debates, 30 April 1981, p. 1832, accessed 4 
April 2014. 
33.  Ibid. 
34.  New South Wales Commission of Audit, Focus on reform, op. cit., p. 1. 
35.  Ibid., p. vii. 
36.  Ibid., p. 68. 
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suitable terms’.37 It also suggested a program of commercialisation, corporatisation and privatisation of certain 
government functions.38  
The 1996 Queensland review stressed the distinction between the direct provision of service by the government 
and the purchase of services by government from the private sector. It concluded that: 
…unless there are other considerations (eg social values, or natural monopoly), efficiency will be maximised by 
limiting the government’s role to that of purchaser of services on behalf of the community [not by providing those 
services itself]. 39 
However, the small government mantra has not been pursued by all reviews. Most notably, the 1973 
Commonwealth Review of Continuing Expenditure sought to rearrange existing expenditure to allow for 
enhanced expenditure in certain areas that were a priority for the Whitlam Government.  
Budget ‘black holes’ 
Reviews which have examined governments’ budgetary affairs have often revealed previously undisclosed 
liabilities, or budget ‘black holes’. This phenomenon was particularly evident during reviews conducted in the 
1980s and 1990s, as developments in government accounting practices and the adoption of accrual accounting 
increasingly required the identification and measurement of hitherto unreported accrual fiscal measures.40  
The first actual attempt to produce a consolidated (or full) set of accrual accounts of any government in Australia 
was undertaken by the 1988 NSW Commission of Audit, which was specifically charged with determining the 
‘true deficit’ of the State.41 It did so by preparing, for the first time, a full set of accrual financial statements for 
the State. Until that point, governments reported upon cash accounting bases that did not record certain 
expenses which were not yet payable, such as employee superannuation or the depreciation of capital assets. 
Essentially, a government’s surplus or deficit position was determined by whether more or less revenue was paid 
into the treasury than was paid out in a given period. That review tentatively suggested that ‘[t]he disclosure of 
the State’s financial position would be vastly improved by … the preparation of an annual balance sheet and 
income and expense statement…’, reports that are now universally required.42  
At the 1991 premiers’ conference, all governments agreed to the adoption of a ‘Uniform Presentation 
Framework’ for the presentation of governmental financial information. That framework was formally agreed by 
the Loan Council in 1997.43 In the interim, the states, territories and the Commonwealth progressively improved 
their financial reporting. Governments struggled with what was seen as a significant challenge. For example, the 
1992 Victorian review noted with some trepidation that ‘[the] preparation of financial statements prepared on 
an accrual basis is a formidable exercise for a government used to cash accounting…’ 44 In the 1994 Tasmanian 
review, the reviewers attempted to prepare a set of consolidated financial statements, but emphasised that the 
result of their efforts had not been audited.45 
The successive reviews in the 1990s often quantified significant unfunded liabilities. Many of these unfunded 
liabilities related to defined benefit public sector superannuation schemes, and the assets and liabilities 
attributable to government business enterprises. For example, in 1992 Victoria estimated that its unfunded 
superannuation liabilities were $17.7 billion, comprising around 87 per cent of the State’s total superannuation 
liability. However, governments in Australia have increased their levels of fiscal transparency and reporting since 
this time. For example, under the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 (Cth), the Treasurer is required to 
periodically report upon the long term fiscal sustainability of the Commonwealth’s finances, including the effect 
of demographic changes. The likelihood of further ‘black holes’ being discovered—at least at the Commonwealth 
level—would appear to be substantially reduced by such developments.   
37.  Independent Commission to Review Tasmania’s Public Sector Finances, Tasmania in the nineties, Tasmanian Government, 1992, p. 207. 
38.  Ibid. 
39.  Queensland Commission of Audit, Report, Queensland Government Printer, 1996, p. xxv. 
40.  Accrual accounting records revenues and expenses when they are earned or incurred, regardless of when any cash is received or dispersed.  
This differs from cash accounting, which only records cash as either a revenue or and expense when it is received or dispersed.   
41.  New South Wales Commission of Audit, Focus on reform, op. cit., preface, p. 1. 
42.  Ibid., p. 41. 
43.  P Costello (Treasurer), ‘Revised Uniform Presentation Framework’, media release, 18 April 1997, accessed 4 April 2014. 
44.  Independent Review of Victoria’s Public Sector Finances, State Finance Victoria, 1992, p. 71.  
45.  Independent Commission to Review Tasmania’s Public Sector Finances, Tasmania in the nineties, op. cit., p. 67. 
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Moreover, in the 1980s and 1990s the various reviewers had a fair degree of latitude and discretion about how 
to undertake such a task. The 1988 New South Wales Commission of Audit advised that ‘[i]n the preparation of 
these financial statements the Commission has been confronted with a number of conceptual and practical 
problems’ before going on to detail the various adjustments it considered necessary. 46 By 2000, all jurisdictions 
had begun preparing consolidated financial statements on an accrual basis according to the Uniform 
Presentation Framework; meaning that whatever discretion there may have been available previously in relation 
to the presentation of a jurisdiction’s financial information was largely removed.  
In their critique of the 2012–13 Queensland review’s Interim Report (the Costello Report), accounting academics 
Walker and Walker highlighted alleged deviations from accepted accounting practices as follows: 
The Costello Report concedes that it is using terminology that differs from that used in the State’s financial 
statements (or in the Uniform Presentation Framework for financial reporting by Australian governments).  
After some discussion, they asserted: 
…the Costello Report deliberately invented its own (misnamed) ‘debt measure’ rather than employing the standard 
analytical tool (widely used in analyses of government finances) of public sector ‘net debt’ …[which] enabled 
Queensland’s debt position to be exaggerated and for the Costello Report to then claim that it was 
‘unsustainable’. 47  
Another often alleged ‘black hole’ has been the discovery of undisclosed fiscal conditions by incoming 
governments, inherited from the previous government. While the government of Prime Minister Howard made 
much of an undisclosed $9 billion deterioration in the Commonwealth’s fiscal position upon coming into office, 
journalist and author Paul Kelly notes that John Howard (as Treasurer under Prime Minister Fraser) had left a 
deficit that was, in relative terms, larger.48 Kelly observes: ‘It had taken him [Howard] years to recover. …He 
knew the politics of fiscal ‘black holes’ and he would [use the revelation] to nail Beazley Labor’.49  Kelly concludes 
that: ‘[the] revelation of this deception not only discredited Labor but invested Howard’s debt reduction agenda 
with a sense of vindication and moral authority’.50 
Political manipulation of budgetary information appears to have a long history. The 1927 South Australian 
reviewers wryly admonished both sides of politics for apparent budgetary manipulations when they said:  
A State Treasurer naturally has pride in balancing a Budget, but it is of paramount importance that actual results in 
a given year be known. Both political parties have been guilty of doing wrong in this respect, and therefore practices 
have been permitted in political circles which would not be tolerated elsewhere. The seriousness of this situation 
has not been realised, and has contributed to the accumulated losses that now confront the State. 51 
Reforms, such as the preparation and publication of independent budget updates as part of the electoral 
processes, mean that such ‘black holes’ are also less likely to arise.   
‘Waste,’ ‘inefficiency,’ and the bureaucracy 
The efficiency of the public sector has been in sharp focus in many reviews. The first review in Western Australia 
in 1873 claimed a lack of efficiency in the bureaucracy. That review recommended:  
…no money should be voted for paying an increased staff, in any department, until it can be shown that the officers 
then employed have been doing their utmost to execute the work of their department, by attending during extra 
hours when required; and that heads of departments should be held responsible for the due attendance and 
application to business of their officers. 52  
As a savings measure that review recommended that no new public official should be entitled to a pension 
under the Superannuation Act. However, that recommendation was only adopted on the casting vote of the 
46.  New South Wales Commission of Audit, Focus on reform, op. cit., Appendix G, p. 2. 
47.  B Walker and B Walker, Review of the Costello report, Queensland Council of Unions, September 2012, p. iv. 
48.  P Kelly, The march of the patriots, Melbourne University Press, 2009, p. 278. 
49  Ibid., p. 278–9. 
50.  Ibid.  
51.  South Australian Parliament, Special Committee on State Finance: Report on the Financial Position of South Australia, op. cit., p. 7. 
52.  Select Committee, ‘Departmental expenditure’, Legislative Council of WA, 1873, p. 3. 
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Chair. In opposing the recommendation, committee member Mr Barlee expressed concern that ‘the class of men 
that thenceforth enter the public service will not be equal to those employed’.53 Similar recommendations have 
been made by later reviews, such as the 2005–06 Australian Capital Territory review which recommended that 
access to the relatively expensive, Commonwealth run, Public Sector Superannuation (PSS) scheme be closed to 
new Australian Capital Territory Government employees.   
The 1919–21 Federal Economies Commission was also particularly scathing of apparent inefficiencies in the 
federal bureaucracy. It observed: 
No systemic or comprehensive inspection of the work performed, or of the methods of performing the work, in any 
office is made; consequently, any claim that the Public Service Commissioner’s Department sees that the staff 
employed in any Department is fully and usefully employed, and that the staff is adequately, but not over, paid, and 
that no additional staff is appointed without full justification, cannot be sustained. 54 
It concluded that ‘[s]uch results …are attributable to some officers satisfying self-imposed standards’.55 
Later reviews have been more subtle regarding perceived public service inefficiencies. The 2012–13 Queensland 
review’s Interim Report, for example, merely noted that Queensland Government employee expenses had 
grown significantly in real terms, and that ‘the large increases in staffing numbers had not been matched by 
commensurate increases in output’. 56 
Purportedly wasteful expenditures have also featured. For example, the 1919–21 Federal Economies 
Commission was particularly scathing of the extravagant and poorly utilised accommodation within Australia’s 
High Commission, Australia House, in London. It said: 
The design of Australia House—with its 350 feet corridors on each floor—and the manner in which it is occupied, 
are against the efficient and economical working of staff, now spread over eight floors. … There are too many rooms 
(each of which has a rental value) occupied by the staff, too many occupied by one person, and too many de luxe. 57 
In relation to the Navy Department, that review cited ‘evidence supplied by highly-placed and reliable officers’, 
which was: 
…of a most disquieting nature, indicating that in many branches of the [Navy] Department’s work no attempt 
whatever is made to check unnecessary extravagance. … In the words of one officer, “There is no administrative 
control, and as a consequence no one considers the cost.”’ 58 
Budget reviews have also found a tendency of bureaucracies to fragment and duplicate functions and activities. 
The first review in Western Australia in 1873 recommended the amalgamation of the office of Crown solicitor 
with that of the Attorney-General.59 Later, the 1919–21 Federal Economies Commission found: 
In the Commonwealth Office Buildings, and in the vicinity, the following Departments have Accountants, and 
Accounting Staff:-  
Prime Minister’s Department; 
Attorney-General’s Department; 
Works and Railways Department; 
Postal Department; 
Treasury Department; 
Trade and Customs Department; 
Home and Territories Department; 
Commonwealth Railways Department. 
53.  Ibid. 
54.  Royal Commission …upon the public expenditure of Australia, First Progress Report, 1919, p. 85. 
55.  Ibid. 
56.  Queensland Commission of Audit, Interim report, op. cit., p. 8. 
57.  Royal Commission …upon the public expenditure of Australia, Final Report, op. cit., p. 112. 
58.  Royal Commission …upon the public expenditure of Australia, First Progress Report, op. cit., p. 7. 
59.  Select Committee, ‘Departmental expenditure’, op. cit., p. 4. 
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If suitable accommodation were available, there are no good reasons why the whole of this accounting work should 
not be amalgamated, with beneficial results in regard to economy, efficiency, and uniformity. 60 
In a similar vein, the 1980–81 Commonwealth Review of Commonwealth functions observed that some 
functions: 
…are much more discrete and overlapping than they need be… [and concluded] …savings might be possible if similar 
welfare functions performed at present by separate branches of the governmental machinery were brought 
together.  There may be valid objectives to such rationalisation but they are difficult for the observer to 
comprehend. 61  
The 1993 Western Australian review attributed this proliferation to, in part, a desire to on behalf of 
governments to ‘satisfy sectoral demands’, and suggested that ‘[i]t is a feature of government administration 
that activities of government agencies expand to meet agencies’ own perceptions of their functions’.62 Apparent 
manipulation of existing budgetary processes was also identified, with the that review observing that ‘agencies 
appear to develop strategies that consume available funds rather than justifying the funds required for agreed, 
defined, measured and controlled objectives as is required of private sector managers’.63 Recently, reviews have 
typically recommended the amalgamations of functions, with both the 2001–02 Western Australian and the 
2005–06 Australian Capital Territory reviews recommending the establishment of shared services bodies to pool 
corporate and administrative functions and achieve efficiencies.64  
Federal-state relations  
The difficulties arising from the interaction between the Commonwealth’s economic policies and those pursued 
by the various States were identified as early as 1927. In the South Australian review of that year, Mr 
Wainwright declined to sign the Supplemental Report prepared by his two private sector counterparts on the 
grounds that ‘as a public servant I desire to avoid matters which are politically controversial…’ Nevertheless, that 
did not stop him from then immediately declaring: 
I agree with the main argument, i.e., that Commonwealth policy is tending more and more to hamper the economic 
welfare of this State. 65 
Inefficiencies arising because of overlap and duplication between the Commonwealth and the States and 
Territories were first discussed at length by the 1980–81 Commonwealth review. That review recommended 
rationalising those functions which were considered to ‘properly belong to the Commonwealth’.66 Further, 
Prime Minister Fraser asserted: 
A nation Australia’s size cannot be effectively governed from Canberra and attempts to inflate Canberra’s power 
have been rejected again and again by the Australian people. 67 
Prime Minister Fraser advised Parliament that government intended to implement the ‘Transfer of Functions to 
the States’ in order to eliminate ‘overlap, waste and interference in the delivery of service and functions’.68  
Similarly, in the 1990s there seemed some degree of consensus (at least between the various reviewers) 
regarding the appropriate division of roles and responsibilities between the two levels of government. The 1996 
National Commission of Audit declared that federal financial arrangements, as they existed then, caused 
‘increasingly blurred allocation of roles and responsibilities’, ‘duplication and overlap of administration’, ‘higher 
60.  Royal Commission …upon the public expenditure of Australia, First Progress Report, op. cit., p. 73. 
61.  M Fraser , Ministerial statement, op. cit., 
62. Independent Commission to Review Public Sector Finances, Agenda for reform , WA Government Printer, 1993, p. 181–2. 
63.  Ibid., p. 184. 
64.  Functional Review Implementation Team, ‘Functional Review Reform Projects’, WA Department of Premier and Cabinet [2002], accessed 
15 October 2013. 
65. South Australian Parliament, Special Committee on State Finance: Supplemental report, op. cit., p. 5. 
66.  M Fraser, Ministerial statement, op. cit. 
67.  Ibid. 
68.  Ibid. 
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costs because of lengthy consultations/negotiations and reporting,’ and ‘avenues for costs shifting’. 69 Amongst 
other things, that review recommended: 
All programs involving multiple levels of government should be closely scrutinised.  In all such cases, the justification 
for multiple levels of government involvement should be critically reviewed. 70 
Similarly, both the 1992 Victorian and the 1994 South Australian reviews suggested that reducing the degree of 
vertical fiscal imbalance would allow state governments greater certainty and flexibility in their budgetary 
positions as well as increasing their accountability for service delivery.71 The 1996 Queensland review also noted 
that ‘[t]he degree of vertical fiscal imbalance in the Australian Federation is extreme and dysfunctional’.72 It too 
called for: 
[a] rationalisation of the roles and responsibilities of the Commonwealth and State Governments in major 
functional areas including health, community services education, training, housing and so on as a matter of high 
priority. 73 
Despite this, the ensuing period was largely considered to have been one of expanding Commonwealth 
activities. For example, academics Parkin and Anderson observe of the Howard Government:  
A piquant Whitlamesque touch with respect to Commonwealth–State relations has probably been most striking in 
the Howard government’s willingness to bypass the States, or compete directly with them, in pursuit of what it 
regards as national goals. 74 
Deregulation and microeconomic reform 
The 1992 Tasmanian review is the only review that has specifically examined the role of microeconomic reform 
in promoting general economic growth. That review recommended that ‘a clearly defined program of review of 
economic legislation ‘…be developed and quickly progressed, reforming that legislation which needlessly impact 
on business by increasing costs and reducing competitiveness’.75 Such a program was, in fact, implemented in all 
jurisdictions soon after in what was known as National Competition Policy. 76 
However, other reviews have also suggested broader economic reforms beyond simple fiscal consolidation. For 
example, the 1973 Commonwealth review was generally critical of assistance to industry ‘beyond the initial 
market discovery stages’. It cited the misallocation of resources across the economy and the direct budgetary 
impacts of tax concessions as being particularly problematic. It concluded: 
…generally it would seem that the forms of assistance most open to criticism are those which do not have a time 
limit—those in which firms are encouraged to believe that the subsidy is, or is likely to become, a permanent part of 
the economic climate. 77 
The political difficulties associated with removing assistance to politically sensitive industries and the 
consequences for employees were also noted when it observed:  
Strong resistance is always manifest when it is proposed that assistance should be withdrawn. This resistance often 
take the form of sustained campaigns hectoring the Government, emotional appeals, and attempts to use workers 
in an industry as pawns in the game. 78 
69.  National Commission of Audit, Report to the Commonwealth Government, op. cit., p. x. 
70.  Ibid., p. 46. 
71  Independent Review of Victoria’s Public Sector Finances, State Finance Victoria, op. cit., p. 240–1.  
72  Queensland Commission of Audit, Report, op. cit., p. 141. 
73  Ibid., p. 142. 
74.  A Parkin and G Anderson, ‘The Howard Government, regulatory federalism and the transformation of Commonwealth–State relations’, 
Australian Journal of Political Science, 42(2), June 2007, pp. 295–314, accessed 4 April 2014. 
75.  Independent Commission to Review Tasmania’s Public Sector Finances, Tasmania in the nineties, op. cit., p. 213. 
76.  J Kain, ‘Australia's National Competition Policy: Its Evolution and Operation’, E-brief, Parliamentary Library, June 2001, revised 3 June 2003, 
accessed 4 April 2014. 
77.  Review of the Continuing Expenditure Policies of the Previous Government, Report, AGPS, Canberra, 1973, p. 23. 
78.  Ibid. 
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The 1927 South Australian review also suggested longer-term economic reform was required to ensure that 
Australia remained internationally competitive. It noted the tendency for governments, however, to adopt 
policies that have the opposite effect. It said: 
A position has been created whereby increased Customs tariff and arbitration awards are being continually raised to 
offset each other. It is surely a time to call a halt. …Other countries are aiming to reduce the cost of production—
Australia’s political policy is not in this direction. 79 
While tariff barriers and centralised wage fixing are now less often cited as drivers of production costs in 
Australia, other areas, such as environmental regulation, have often been cited as causes of a loss of 
competitiveness.80 
Bailouts and asset sales 
Poor capital investment decisions by government businesses have been a re-occurring theme in reviews. The 
1927 South Australian reviewers noted that much of the borrowings had been for capital works that had not 
produced sufficient returns, creating a burden in the form of taxation and deficits.81 The 1927 South Australian 
review was concerned about the losses within the railways, which ‘in effect, means that State is contributing to 
railway fares from taxation…’ 82 The reviewers attributed the cause of this to ‘the developmental and political 
lines, which cannot pay for many years’. 83  
South Australia’s and Victoria’s debt burdens of the early 1990s were significantly increased by bailouts of failed 
financial institutions, but none of the subsequent reviews were specifically tasked with investigating the 
circumstances or consequences of the collapse of those institutions. Nonetheless, the 1993–94 South Australian 
reviewers described the collapse of the State Bank of South Australia as ‘the greatest financial disaster in the 
history of Australia’s public sectors’.84  
A more general theme of the various reviews is that governments should withdraw from the multifarious range 
of commercial or quasi-commercial functions they had typically embarked on, irrespective of whether or not 
they are commercially sound. For example, following the 1980–81 Review of Commonwealth Functions the 
Commonwealth decided that Australia Post should lose many statutory monopoly roles and that a further 
review be held on Telecom (as it was then) to determine ‘the extent to which there could be private sector 
involvement in activities currently performed...’85 That review also made much more seemingly mundane 
recommendations for the direct sale of Commonwealth Government assets, such as the recommendation that 
the Commonwealth sell the Belconnen Mall shopping centre in Canberra.86  
While many asset sales by governments have commonly been characterised as exercises in order to realise quick 
returns in order to supplement the budget, most reviews have focused upon the extent to which specific 
commercial operation of governments continue to provide a good or service that cannot be readily provided by 
the private sector. For example, the 1992–93 Victorian review suggested that budgetary considerations were 
important, but that ‘[i]n the Commission’s view, these should be secondary to the pursuit of gains in operational 
efficiency which can be recognised through more extensive competition and private sector involvement’.87 
Controversies 
Understandably, such broad ranging reviews, particularly those conducted by incoming governments seeking to 
reset the economic and policy agenda of a jurisdiction have often been contentious. Key areas of controversy 
include the conduct of the reviews themselves and the suspicion that such reviews have been preordained to 
make certain conclusions. Moreover, the prevalence of businesspeople on the various reviews has led some to 
conclude they are vehicles through which to advance the interest of business over others in the community. The 
79.  South Australia, Parliament, Special Committee on State Finance: Supplemental report, op. cit., p. 3. 
80.  For example, A Hepworth and S Maher, ‘BCA uses first talks to revive green tape war’, The Australian, 3 July 2013, p. 6, accessed 4 April 2014. 
81.  South Australia, Parliament, Special Committee on State Finance: Supplemental report, op. cit., p. 3. 
82.  South Australia, Parliament, Special Committee on State Finance: Report on the Financial Position of South Australia, op. cit., p. 7. 
83  Ibid., p. 8. 
84  South Australian Commission of Audit, Charting the way forward, improving public sector performance, April 1994, pp. 3–5. 
85.  M Fraser, Ministerial statement, op. cit., Appendix A, p. 9. 
86.  Ibid., p. 7. 
87.  Victorian Commission of Audit, Report, May 1993, vol. 2, p. 314. 
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governments appointing them, however, have often fuelled such suspicions through failing to manage the 
various political consequences that have invariably arisen. 
Lack of public participation and secrecy 
By keeping the findings of the reviews confidential or secret, some governments have also created additional 
problems for themselves. For example, various parties sought to gain access to the report of the confidential 
2005–06 Australian Capital Territory Strategic and Functional Review under both Freedom of Information (FOI) 
laws and via parliamentary orders for the production of documents. In response to freedom of information 
requests, the Government issued a conclusive certificate under subsection 35(3) of the Freedom of Information 
Act 1989 (ACT), as it was then, to prevent the release of the review and associated Cabinet materials. However, 
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of the Australian Capital Territory found that some of the materials were 
improperly classified and allowed their release.88 In response to the production order, the Government claimed 
executive privilege over the report. After some dispute, the Standing Orders of the Australian Capital Territory 
Legislative Assembly were amended to provide that an independent arbiter would assess the veracity of claims 
of executive privilege prior to the tabling of any documents. 89 Sir Laurence Street AC KCMG QC was appointed as 
the arbiter and determined that the claim of executive privilege over the final report of the Strategic and 
Functional Review was valid, thereby preventing their release.90 A later attempt to amend the FOI Act to require 
the release of the report failed due to a lack of parliamentary support for that Bill. 91 To date, the report of the 
Strategic and Functional Review has still not been publicly released. 
The current National Commission of Audit differs in that it has formally sought public submissions and met with 
certain submitters.92 Moreover, the Treasurer has advised that the report of the Audit will be released 
publicly.93 However, a lingering sense of secrecy remains; and on 11 December 2013 the Australian Senate 
resolved to establish the ‘Select Committee into the Abbott Government’s Commission of Audit’ seemingly to 
subject the conduct of the review to scrutiny by the Parliament.94  
Hidden agendas and ulterior motives 
In addition to specific recommendations and conclusions, reviews have been seen as a vehicle for rescinding 
from prior policy commitments or pursuing an altogether different policy agenda. For example, Walker and 
Walker opine:  
…all of these importantly titled Commissions of ‘Audit’ pursued a familiar theme. The incoming government had 
inherited a financial crisis. The financial cupboard was bare. There was a high level of debt. There was a need to cut 
a range of programs and reduce the size of the public sector. 95 
Similarly, economics Professor John Quiggin says: 
The primary stated task of these Commissions, as implied by the name, is to review the current and forecast 
condition of public finances and to make recommendations for improvement. In reality, however, the primary 
function has been to justify cuts in public expenditure and other policy changes. In most cases, these policy changes 
have not formed part of the platform on which the newly elected government campaigned and, in many cases, they 
represent a direct repudiation of election promises. 96 
In Victoria, a common perception was that the 1992–93 review was merely a marketing exercise aimed at 
implementing a particular scheme of economic liberalisation and fiscal rectitude which was in part assisted by 
the release of a precursor report, Victoria: an agenda for change, in 1991. That earlier report was a joint 
publication by the right-leaning Tasman Institute and the Institute for Public Affairs, and was prepared at the 
88.  Dunne/Barden and ACT Department of Education & Training [2007] ACTAAT 26 (17 December 2007), accessed 4 April 2014. 
89.  ACT Legislative Assembly, Standing Order 213A, accessed 4 April 2014. 
90.  J Stanhope (ACT Chief Minister), ‘Chief Minister welcomes arbiter's decision on functional review’, media release, 8 April 2009, accessed 15 
October 2013.   
91.  Government Transparency Legislation Amendment Bill 2007 (No 2) (ACT), accessed 4 April 2014. 
92.  T Shepherd (Chair, National Commission of Audit), Evidence to Senate Select Committee on Abbott Government’s Commission of Audit, Inquiry 
into Commission of Audit established by the Commonwealth government, 15 January 2014, accessed 4 April 2014. 
93.  J Heath and M Dunkley, ‘Get audit in open, Hockey told,’ Australian Financial Review, 16 January 2014, p. 1, accessed 4 April 2014. 
94.  Australia, Senate, Journals, 10, 2013, p. 345–6, accessed 4 April 2014.  
95.  B Walker and B Walker, Review of the Costello report, op. cit., p. iv.  
96. J Quiggin, The Queensland Commission of Audit Final Report: A Critical Review, Public Policy, 7(2), 2012, p. 226, accessed 4 April 2014. 
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behest of a collection of Victorian business groups known as Project Victoria. Several members of former 
government-initiated reviews, including Des Moore and Robert Officer, were involved in the preparation of that 
report.97   
The Agenda for change report was unambiguously small government in its tenor.  In its introduction, that review 
explained its approach in the following terms: 
The reforms proposed by Project Victoria, … amount to a major restructuring of the expenditure programs of the 
Government of Victoria, as well as a broad-based strategy for increasing productivity and living standards, by 
privatising, corporatizing and contracting out many current services of government. If implemented on a national 
scale, the strategy would, for example, be compatible with significantly lowering all income tax rates and could 
dramatically improve the nature of work and savings incentives in Australia. 98 
Having this as its provenance, the subsequent 1992–93 Victorian review—which was chaired again by Robert 
Officer—was cited by critics as a ‘stalking horse’ for the proponents of the Agenda for change report. For 
example, Costar and Economou observe:   
In its structure, content, and conclusions, An Agenda for Change is a trimmed-down early version of the report of 
the Commission of Audit.  It concluded that state finances were in disarray and that Labor had bequeathed a debt 
crisis arising from too much spending, which in turn was a product of Labor having been ‘captured’ by the public 
sector trade unions. 99 
Similar suspicions have been raised regarding the current National Commission of Audit. In March 2013 the 
Institute of Public Affairs published a list of possible expenditure cuts.100 That list proposed the abolition of a 
range of Commonwealth agencies and other expenditure reductions. In discussing the proposals, Alan Moran of 
the Institute of Public Affairs advised: 
Some items have been discussed with Coalition politicians, many of whom are in agreement with the principles 
against which the list has been developed. 101 
This led then Finance Minister, Penny Wong, to declare that the Institute of Public Affairs had ‘revealed some of 
the savage cuts Tony Abbott is considering making if elected’.102 
Political mishandling 
It would appear risky for governments to establish wide-ranging budget reviews if they do not, in fact, have the 
resolve to adopt at least some of the recommendations. Particularly for incoming governments, the 
appointment of a budget review may also delay the government establishing its own agenda or narrative; and 
seeing government publicly resiling from the bold pronouncements typically made at the commencement of a 
review also compound public concerns about the direction of the administration.   
For example, upon forming government in 2010 with a slim parliamentary majority, the former Victorian 
Premier Baillieu duly appointed an ‘Independent Review of State Finances’, chaired by Michael Vertigan AC. In 
April 2011 that panel produced an Interim Report which was publicly released by the Government. That report 
provided an assessment of the finances of the State but did not provide any specific policy prescriptions. In 
January 2012, the final report was delivered to the Government.  
However, it would appear that by the time the final report arrived, either the Government’s reformist zeal had 
dissipated, or the final report was so politically unpalatable that it could not be released. 103 By 2013, following 
Denis Napthine succeeding Baillieu as Premier, the new Victorian Treasurer Michael O'Brien disavowed any 
knowledge of the contents of the final report, and suggested that it would have no bearing on the next Victorian 
Budget.104  
97.  B Costar and N Economou, The Kennett revolution, UNSW Press, Sydney, 1999, p. 141. 
98.  Tasman Institute and Institute of Public Affairs, Victoria: an agenda for change, 1991, p. 1, emphasis in original. 
99.  B Costar and N Economou, The Kennett revolution, op. cit., p. 140. 
100.  Attachment to: P Wong (Minister for Finance and Deregulation), ‘Revealed: Abbott’s secret list of cuts’, media release, 17 March 2013. 
101.  A Creighton, ‘Think tank proclaims savings worth $23.5 billion’ The Weekend Australian, 16 March 2013, p. 4.  
102.  P Wong (Minister for Finance and Deregulation), ‘Revealed: Abbott’s secret list of cuts’, media release, 17 March 2013, accessed 4 April 2014. 
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In a recent article, former Commonwealth Treasurer Costello and Chair of the 2012–13 Queensland review 
noted the Victorian Government’s experience and concluded ‘…there is no point in making recommendations 
with no hope of implementation. A report which can’t be released is of no value. A report that makes impractical 
suggestions is little better’.105 
Conclusions 
The National Commission of Audit appointed by the Abbott Government is not at all unprecedented in Australia. 
Governments of both political persuasions have used such reviews to quickly and critically examine jurisdictions’ 
fiscal positions and develop strategies to restore jurisdictions’ finances. At times, they have also used to criticise 
previous governments for their budgetary management, or to provide a pretext to deviate from prior policy 
commitments.   
Strong institutional reasons exist for budget reviews to be appointed, especially early in the term of a new 
government, as successful budget reviews allow the incoming government to establish and define its policy 
agenda. However, a review that is poorly managed, or that provides wholly unpalatable recommendations not 
politically or practicably capable of being implemented, can lead to a sense of policy paralysis or a lack of 
direction on behalf of the government.  
Several budget reviews have proposed clear frameworks through which to structure their thinking and guide 
their conclusions; many have not. Almost all have touched upon certain central themes: that government 
finances are unsustainable, government has entered into areas and functions to which it is ill suited, the 
bureaucracy is fragmented or inefficient, and federal-state relations are problematic. Typically, reviews have also 
suggested a scheme of broader economic reform; the freeing up of the business environment and privatising 
government commercial activities.  
Critiques of such reviews, however, have made much of the strong business connections to many reviews. The 
secrecy in which they are typically conducted has arguably contributed to heightened public suspicion about 
their conduct and ultimate recommendations. 
If conducted well, the current National Commission of Audit could provide the Abbott Government an 
opportunity to clearly articulate the challenges facing Australia and provide at least a conceptual basis for 
addressing those challenges. However, former Commonwealth Treasurer Costello suggests that merely 
rehashing past reviews will not suffice. He says: 
An audit will be of no use if it confines itself to well-worn paths that have been debated over and again by 
politicians. There is no point in bringing outsiders in to regurgitate what they already know. Outsiders should bring a 
fresh perspective and give the Government new options. 106 
Both the content of the current National Commission of Audit, and the Government’s response, are yet to be 
released publicly. It remains to be seen whether or not the current National Commission of Audit provide truly 
new ideas and a clear vision for the newly elected government, or whether it will merely repackage old and well 
known policy prescriptions. It is also not clear whether the Government has the political courage to adopt the 
review’s recommendations; however, ignoring the review would appear to be politically risky also. 
 
105.  P Costello, ‘Opinion: Meaning well is no substitute for good policy’, Herald Sun, 24 September 2013, p. 25, accessed 4 April 2014. 
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Appendix A: Detailed chronology of budget reviews in Australia 
Years Jurisdiction Title Commissioned Political affiliation Membership Key dates Comment 
1873 Western 
Australia 
Select Committee of 
the Legislative 
Council to Consider 
and Report Upon 
Departmental 
Expenditure 
Colonial Secretary 
Sir Frederick 
Palgrave Barlee  
Not applicable Chair: Major John Logue, 
Stockowner 
Sir Frederick Palgrave 
Barlee, Colonial Secretary 
Wallace Bickley, merchant 
James George Lee Steere, 
farmer 
William Edward Marmion, 
businessperson 
Walter Padbury, 
businessperson and farmer 
Thomas Campbell Carey, 
surveyor. 
Appointed: 4 July 
1873 
Tabled: 31 July 1873 
All members of the 
Committee were also 
members of the 
Western Australian 
Legislative Council. 
However, the review 
was conducted prior to 
responsible 
government in Western 
Australia and while 
some members of the 
Legislative Council 
were still appointed by 
the Governor. For 
example, Sir Frederick 
Barlee was an ex officio 
(unelected) member of 
the Council in his 
capacity as Colonial 
Secretary. 
1918–21 Commonwealth Royal Commission 
...upon the public 
expenditure of the 
Commonwealth of 
Australia with a view 
to effecting 
economies (Federal 
Economies 
Commission) 
Prime Minister 
William “Billy” 
Hughes 
Nationalist Chair: Sir Robert Gibson, 
businessperson 
George Turton, 
businessperson 
Gilbert Haldane, public 
servant 
Appointed: 
21 November 1918 
First Progress Report 
submitted: 16 July 
1919 
Final Report: 4 April 
1921 
This review was 
established as a Royal 
Commission under the 
Royal Commissions Act 
1902 (Cth) and it the 
only review to have 
enjoyed such formal 
legal powers. 
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Years Jurisdiction Title Commissioned Political affiliation Membership Key dates Comment 
1927 South Australia Special Committee 
on State Finances 
Premier Sir Richard 
Butler 
Liberal Federation Chair: Walter James Young, 
businessperson 
Harold Gordon Darling, 
businessperson 
John William Wainright, 
public servant and 
accountant 
Appointed: 25 May 
1927 
First Progress 
Report: 14 October 
1927 
Final report: 
19 October 1927 
Supplemental 
report: 19 October 
1927 
 
1973 Commonwealth Review of the 
Continuing 
Expenditure Policies 
of the Previous 
Government 
Prime Minister 
Gough Whitlam 
Labor Chair: Dr Herbert Coombs, 
public servant 
M A Besley, public servant 
Dr S F Harris, public servant 
James Jacob Speigleman, 
political advisor 
John Owen Stone, public 
servant and politician 
Padraic McGuinness, 
political advisor  
R D Phillips, public servant 
Appointed: 
28 March 1973 
Reported: 24 June 
1973 
John Stone later 
became the Treasury 
Secretary under both 
Prime Minsters Fraser 
and Hawke and was 
elected to the Senate, 
as a National, for 
Queensland.  
James Speigleman later 
became the Chief 
Justice of the NSW 
Supreme Court and 
chairperson of the 
Australian Broadcasting 
Commission.   
Padraic McGuinness 
later became the 
editor-in-chief of the 
Australian Financial 
Review and editor of 
Quadrant. 
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Years Jurisdiction Title Commissioned Political affiliation Membership Key dates Comment 
1980–81 Commonwealth Review of 
Commonwealth 
Functions 
Prime Minister 
Malcolm Fraser 
Liberal/Country 
Party coalition 
Sir Phillip Lynch, politician Appointed: 1980 
Statement to 
Parliament: 30 April 
1981 
 
1988 New South 
Wales 
Focus on Reform: 
Report on The 
State’s Finances 
(NSW Commission 
of Audit) 
Premier Nick 
Greiner 
Liberal Chairman: Charles Curran 
AO, businessperson 
Jim Dominguez AM, 
businessperson 
James Yonge, 
businessperson 
Executive director: Don 
Nicholls, former public 
servant 
Appointed: 4 April 
1988 
Reported: 29 July 
1988 
This review was the 
first to adopt the 
‘Commission of Audit’ 
nomenclature. 
1992 Tasmania Tasmania in the 
Nineties 
Premier Ray Groom Liberal Chairman: Charles Curran 
AO, businessperson 
Bob Graham, economist 
and businessperson 
John Harris, businessperson 
Executive member: Don 
Nicholls AM, former public 
servant 
Established: 1 March 
1992 
Reported: 3 April 
1992 
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Years Jurisdiction Title Commissioned Political affiliation Membership Key dates Comment 
1992 Victoria State Finance 
Victoria: 
Independent Review 
of Victoria’s Public 
Sector Finances 
Premier Joan Kirner Labor Independent reviewer: Don 
Nicholls, former public 
servant  
Chairman of review panel: 
John McIntosh, 
businessperson 
Mary Crooks, 
non-government 
organisation 
Michael McGinniss, 
accountant 
George Pappas, consultant 
Commenced: 10 July 
1992 
Reported: 21 
September 1992 
 
1992–93 Victoria Victorian 
Commission of Audit 
Premier Jeff Kennett Liberal/National  
coalition 
Chairman: Professor Robert 
Officer, businessperson 
David Christensen, 
businessperson 
Russel Walker, public 
servant 
Terms of reference: 
9 October 1992 
Report: 30 April 
1993 
 
1993 Western 
Australia 
Report of the 
Independent 
Commission to 
Review Public Sector 
Finances 
Premier Richard 
Court 
Liberal Chairman: Lesley McCarrey, 
public servant  
Peter Leonhardt, 
businessperson and 
accountant 
Charles MacKinnon, 
businessperson 
Phil Unsworth, 
businessperson 
Announced: 
19 February 1993 
Reported (volume 
1): 18 June 1993 
Reported (volume 
2): 24 August 1993 
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Years Jurisdiction Title Commissioned Political affiliation Membership Key dates Comment 
1993–94 South Australia Charting the way 
forward: improving 
public sector 
performance 
Premier Dean Brown  Liberal Chair: J Robert Thomas AO 
(chairman), businessperson 
Michael J Janes, 
businessperson 
Professor Cliff Walsh, 
academic economist and 
political advisor  
Executive Member: Don 
Nicholls, former public 
servant at the NSW 
Treasury 
Executive Officer: Elizabeth 
Warhurst, capacity 
unknown 
Terms of reference: 
15 December 1993 
Reported: 22 April 
1994 
 
1996 Queensland Queensland 
Commission of Audit 
Premier Rob 
Borbidge 
National Chairman: Vincent W. 
FitzGerald, businessperson 
Commissioner: Jeff 
Carmichael, academic 
Commissioner: Darryl 
McDonough, 
businessperson 
Commissioner: Barry 
Thornton, businessperson 
Terms of reference: 
12 March 1996 
Report: 30 June 
1996 
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Years Jurisdiction Title Commissioned Political affiliation Membership Key dates Comment 
1996 Commonwealth National 
Commission of Audit 
Prime Minister John 
Howard 
Liberal/National 
coalition 
Chairman: Robert Officer, 
businessperson 
Elizabeth Alexander AM, 
businessperson 
John Fraser, businessperson 
Maurice Newman AM, 
businessperson 
Executive Officer: Geoff 
Carmody, economist 
Terms of reference: 
early-March 1996 
Report: 19 June 
1996 
 
2001–02 Australian 
Capital Territory 
Report on the State 
of the Territory’s 
Finances 
Chief Minister Jon 
Stanhope  
Labor Chair: Will Laurie, 
businessperson and 
accountant 
Dr Penny Gregory, public 
servant 
Howard Ronaldson, public 
servant 
Announced: 
15 January 2002 
Reported: 7 March 
2002 
 
2001–02 Western 
Australia 
Review of the 
Effective Delivery of 
Government 
Priorities 
Premier Geoff 
Gallop 
Labor Chair: Michael Costello AO, 
former public servant 
Mal Wauchope, public 
servant 
John Langoulant, public 
servant 
Allan Skinner, public servant 
Appointed: 
June 2002 
Reported: 
9 December 2002 
The report was not 
released. 
2005–06 Australian 
Capital Territory 
Strategic and 
Functional Review 
Chief Minister Jon 
Stanhope 
Labor Michael Costello AO, former 
public servant 
Greg Smith, public servant 
and economist 
Established: 
November 2005 
Decisions 
announced: 6 June 
2006 
The report was not 
released. 
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Years Jurisdiction Title Commissioned Political affiliation Membership Key dates Comment 
2008–09 Western 
Australia 
Economic Audit 
Committee 
Premier Colin 
Barnett  
Liberal/National 
coalition 
Administrative Chair: 
Timothy Marney, public 
servant  
Professor Peter Shergold 
AC, academic, banker, and 
public servant 
John Langoulant, public 
servant and businessperson 
Catherine Nance, 
accountant and 
businessperson 
Peter Conran, public 
servant 
Mal Wauchope, public 
servant 
Appointed: October 
2008 
Preliminary Report: 
March 2009  
Final Report: 
30 October 2009 
 
2009–10 South Australia Sustainable Budget 
Commission 
Premier Mike Rann Labor Chair: Geoff Carmody, 
economist and former 
public servant  
Bruce Carter, accountant 
and businessperson 
Monsignor David Cappo AO, 
social inclusion advocate 
and advisor 
Professor Jennifer 
Westacott,  public servant 
and businessperson 
Chris Eccles, public servant 
Jim Wright, public servant 
Appointed: 4 June 
2008 
First report: 
24 December 2009 
Second Report: 
25 August 2010 
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2011–12 Victoria Independent Review 
of State Finances 
Premier Ted Baillieu Liberal/National 
coalition 
Michael Vertigan AC, public 
servant 
Ian Harper, public servant 
Don Challen, public servant 
Announced: 
25 January 2011 
Interim report: 
15 April 2011 
Final report: due 
February 2012 
The final report was 
not released.  
2011–12 New South 
Wales 
NSW Commission of 
Audit 
Premier Barry 
O’Farrell 
Liberal/National 
coalition 
Chief Executive: Dr Kerry 
Schott, businessperson 
Chair of advisory board: 
David Gonski AC 
businessperson 
Ex officio: Chris Eccles, 
public servant 
Ex officio: Phil Gaetjens, 
NSW Treasury Secretary 
Gerard Sutton AO, research 
scientist and former 
university chief 
Dr Sue Page AM, doctor, 
academic and political 
advisor 
Peter Shergold AC, 
academic, banker, and 
public servant 
Belinda Hutchinson AM, 
banker and businesswoman  
Richard Spencer, 
businessperson in non-
profit sector 
Established: August 
2011 
Interim report: 
Public Sector 
Management, 
24 January 2012 
Final report: 
Government 
Expenditure, 4 May 
2012 
The Review was 
formally conducted by 
Dr Kerry Schott, but 
drew upon an Advisory 
Board chaired by David 
Gonski AC. 
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2012–13 Northern 
Territory 
Renewal 
Management Board 
Chief Minister Terry 
Mills  
Country Liberal 
Party 
Chair: Neil Conn, economist 
and public servant 
Deputy Chair: Ken Clarke, 
former public servant, 
consultant and 
businessperson 
Deputy Chair: John 
Gardiner, businessperson 
Under Treasurer: Alan 
Tregilgas, economist and 
public servant 
Announced: 
5 September 2012 
Progress report 
released: 29 October 
2012 
The final report was 
not released. 
2012–13 Queensland Queensland 
Commission of Audit 
Premier Campbell 
Newman  
Liberal National 
Party 
Chairman: Peter Costello 
AC, former politician 
Dr Doug McTaggart, 
businessperson and public 
servant 
Professor Sandra Harding, 
academic 
Announced: 
29 March 2012 
Interim Report: 
15 June 2012 
Interim 
Recommendations: 
30 November 2012 
Final Report: 
February 2013 
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2013–14 Commonwealth National 
Commission of Audit 
Prime Minister 
Abbott 
Liberal/National 
coalition 
Chair: Tony Sheppard AO, 
businessperson 
Dr Peter Boxall AO, 
economist and former 
public servant 
Tony Cole AO, former public 
servant  
Robert Fisher AM, public 
servant 
Amanda Vanstone, former 
politician 
Head of Secretariat: Peter 
Crone, economist 
Announced: 
22 October 2013 
First Phase due to 
Government: end 
January 2014 
Second Phase due to 
Government: end 
March 2014 
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